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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LELAND D. MORAN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
GEORGIA R. SHAW, Acting Director, 
Utah State Department of Public 
Safety, Driver's License Division, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 240884 
Appellant appeals from the lower Court's determination 
that Appellant's driving privilege in the State of Utah be revoked 
pursuant to a Driver's License Revocation Hearing with regard to 
Appellant's alleged refusal to submit to a chemical test. 
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DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
A 110n-jury trial de novo was held on April 19, 1977, in 
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Hononble Stewart M. Hanson Jr., Judge oresiding, the 
Court having taken the matter under advisement and on or about 
April 20, l9i7, the lower Court entered a Judgment against Appel-
lant denying Appellant's Petitior. for restoration of his driver's 
license, determining that the Appellant unreasonably refused to 
submit to a chemical test pursuant to Utah Cod~ Annotated Section 
41-6-44.10, (1953, as amended). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the lower Court's decision re-
versed and to have the Supreme Court of the State of Utah restore 
Appellant's driving privilege, or in the alternative, that the 
case be remanded to the trial Court for a new hearing. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant was operating a motor vehicle on a public 
highway on Interstdte 80 approximately 13 miles east of Wendover, 
Utah, on the 24th day of December, i976, at the approximate hour 
of 11:00 p.m. At that approximate time and location, a Utah 
Highway Patrolman, Gary Ogilvie, who was operating radar, observe" 
Aopellant's automobiie which was allegedly trqveling over the 
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posted speed limit of 55 miles per hour and said Patrolman there-
upon proceeded to stop the Appellant's vehicle. 
The Appellant was thereafter arrested for driving under 
the influence of alcohol and was placed in the patrol vehicle and 
transported to the jail located at Wendover, Utah. That at the 
jail the Officer commenced to read an Implied Consent Form regard-
ing the chemical test, but never completed reading the same. 
Appellant requested of Officer Ogilvie the right to con-
tact his attorney but was unable to do so. The Officer stated that 
if he could not afford an attorney that one would be appointed for 
the Appellant. Appellant thereupon requested that an attorney be 
appointed for him but the Officers stated that they would not and 
could not appoint an attorney for Appellant. 
In the meantime, Officer Nelson, another Peace Officer, 
arrived at the scene and the Appellant and Officer Nelson became 
argumentative and a physical schuffle took place between Appellant 
and said Officer. Officer Nelson afterwards left the room and the 
Appellant was placed in a dark cell. A short time later Officer 
Ogilvie went to the cell and allegedly read the Appellant his 
rights under the Utah Implied Consent Statute through several small 
holes in the steel door of the cell, but received no reply. 
The following day the Appellant was released from the 
j a i 1 . 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANT CANNOT BE HELD TO HAVE REFUSED TO SUBMIT TO A 
CHEMICAL TEST UNDER THE UTAH IMPLIED CONSENT STATUTE WHERE THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE ATMOSPHERE WERE AGITATED AND CONFUSING AND 
WHERE ALL OF THE RIGHTS CONTAINED IN SAID STATUTE WERE NOT FULLY 
EXPLAINED TO THE APPELLANT SO HE COULD UNDERSTAND THOSE RIGHTS 
AND BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO SUBMIT OR TO REFUSE THE CHEMICAL 
TEST BASED UPON A REASONABLE UNDERSTANDING OF THOSE RIGHTS. 
The Courts have long recognized that an individual is 
denied his constitutional rights, such as those setforth in the 
Miranda Warning, when tf1ose rights are not c 1 early stated to the 
accused and in such a manner as to reasonably inform an accused 
of those rights and when the atmosphere at that particular time 
a~d place is agitated and confused. In the 1969 Utah Supreme 
Court case of Hunter vs. Darius, 23 Ut.2d 122, 451 P.2d 877, 
Justice Ellett in the dissent stated that " ... the statute ;Juts 
the duty upon the arresting officer to advise the arrested of his 
rights ... " 
In the i r. stan t case , A r> p e 11 ant was never f u 11 y i n formed 
of his rights under the Utah Implied Consent Statute nor given 
the opportunity to either submit or rehse the chemica 1 test. T~e 
only basis f0r refusal in this case is when the Aopellant stated 
he would not take a chemical test until he consulted with his 
attorney. The Implied Consent Statute was not either fully read 
to the Appellant before this statement or after. 
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The entire circumstances and atmosphere from shortly after 
the Appellant was arrested until he was placed in a jail cell was 
one of confusion, agitation, and physical contact. 
Officer Ogilvie stated that he commenced to read the 
Implied Consent Statute to the Appellant but never completed the 
reading thereof as the Appellant repeatedly requested the appoint-
ment or opportunity to contact counsel. Furthermore, at the same 
time, Officer Nelson became combative with the Appellant and Officer 
Ggi 1 vie stated he did not read the Implied Consent Statute at that 
time because of those circumstances. 
In the Hunter case, supra, the Court held that an indivi-
dual must be advised of his rights under the Utah Implied Statute 
after the individual refuses to submit to a chemical test. When 
the Appellant herein said he would not take a chemical test until 
he consulted an attorney, the same was not a refusal to submit 
under the Statute and cases in effect at the time of this incident. 
At no time thereafter, excepting as hereinafter stated was the 
Appellant informed of his rights and the full implication of the 
Implied Consent Statute. 
In the case of Hyde vs. Darius, 549 P.2d 451, (Utah, 
1976), the Court held that a consent being implied, may be with-
drawn only by the express refusal and that one who neither refuses 
nor submits to a chemical test has not refused to take the test 
(emphasis mine). As the Appell ant herein was never informed of his 
rights nor given the opportunity to submit or refuse to take the 
test, there was no refusal. 
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Officer Ogilvie stated that he plac2d the A[)pellant in 
a dark cell behind a steel door which had only several small hole 
drilled in the door for air. He thereupon made notes regarding 
the arrest, and circumstances involved therein, and sometime 
thereafter stated he read the Implied Consent Statute thrO'Jgh the 
steel door to the Appellant who he could not <;ee and from whom he 
heard not~ing but subsequent snoring. 
The trial Court erred when it held that the Appellant wa 1 
fully informed of his rights under the Imol i ed Consent Statute ir 
these circumstances and that the Appellant was given the right to 
either submit or refuse to· take the chemica 1 test, and in revokinq 
Appellant's dri~ing privilege in the State of Utah. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL. 
Office• Ogilvie stated that he read the Miranda Warning 
to the Appellant after the arrest but did r.ot ask the Appellant 
whether or not he understood those rights. 
At the jail, the Appellant stated that he would net tak1 
a chemical test until a lawyer was present and requested the Offie 
to appoint an attorney as they nad previously stated they would d: 
under the t1i rand a Warning. The Officers stated they would not ap· 
point an attorney for him. 
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Furthermore, at the jail, Officer Ogilvie stated to the 
Appellant th.1t he could make a telephone call and the Appellant 
made the call in an attempt to secure help for himself. The 
Appellant reasonably believed he was allowed only one telephone 
call and again requested of the Officers to appoint counsel for 
him which was refused. 
The Appellant stated that he gave a business card of an 
attorney in Salt Lake City to the Officers and requested they con-
tact said attorney, but again the Officers refused to ca 11. In 
the case of Peterson vs. Darius, 547 P.2d 693, (Utah, 1976), the 
Court held that a demand that the accused's attorney be present 
before the administration of a test was not an unreasonable delay. 
In the present case, the Appellant did not attempt to delay by 
requesting a Salt Lake attorney to appear in Wendover as the 
Appellant requested the Officers to appoint counsel for him as 
they stated they would do or to find an attorney in Wendover for 
him, but his request for counsel was denied. 
In the case of Hyde vs. Darius, supra, the Court found 
that the circumstances wherein the plaintiff was involved in an 
accident and whi 1 e sti 11 agitated and upset was informed of the 
provisions of the Implied Consent Law without expressly refusing 
to take a chemical test, the subsequent suspension of her driver's 
license on that ground was error. In the present case the Appellant 
was i n v o 1 v ed on an argument at i v e basi s w i t h the 0 f f i c e r s and i n 
Physical contact with Officer Nelson, and the circumstances sur-
rounding the alleged informing of the Appellant of his rights under 
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the Utah Implied Consent Statute and the Appellant's right to 
counsel were done in an agitated and confused atmosphere makin\ 
it impossible for any form of communication between the parties 
Suspension of the Appellant's driver's license herein 
by the trial Court is also an error. 
CONCLUSION 
The Judgment of the trial Court should be reversed and 
the Appellant's driving privilege should he reinstated as the , 
Appellant was not informed of his rights under the Utah Impli~' 
Consent Statute and ·,o~as actually and constructively denied his 
right to counsel herein and further, the evidence does not supw 
the trial Court's determination that Appellant's driving privili: 
should be revoked. 
DATED this day of November, 1977. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
P. ROBERT KNIGHT 
Attorney for Appellant 
Knight Building 
1606 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411' 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I ~-delivered a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to Bruce M. Hale, 
Attorney for Respondent, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, 84114, postage prepaid, this ,~:Jfday of November, 
1977. 
f ;:_d:r_d )(4~/ 
P. ROBERT KNIGHT 
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